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Abstract
The use of cloud computing (CC) is rapidly increasing due to the demand for internet services and
communications. The large number of services and data stored in the cloud creates security risks due to
the dynamic movement of data, connected devices and users between various cloud environments. In this
study, we will develop an innovative prototype for location-aware access control and data privacy for CC
systems. We will apply location-aware access control policies to role-based access control of Cloud Foundry,
and then analyze the impact on user privacy after implementing these policies. This innovation can be used to
address the security risks introduced by inter-cloud use and communication, and will have significant impact
in making citizen’s personal data more secure.
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1. Introduction
The importance of cloud computing (CC) is increasing
due to the high demand of internet services. Hosting
data of organizations on the cloud is cost-effective.
A challenge for the adoption of cloud hosted data
for any organization is that the resource allocations
and organization differ between the various providers
of CC services. In addition, most employees and
users can access CC systems from various locations.
This movement of the users might leak sensitive
information to the public, due to insecurities of the
accessing network infrastructure, vulnerabilities in
the devices used for the access as well as different
laws and regulations governing the access of personal
information across various jurisdictions. Therefore,
∗Corresponding author. Email: wen.zeng.wz@gmail.com
it is important to integrate location-aware access
control policy within the CC systems, especially
when considerations to implement controls for GDPR
compliance.
Location-aware access control can be used to imple-
ment the principle of least privilege, by allowing access
to specific resources only in specific locations [32].
Another benefit of location-aware access control is that
it supports separation of duty based on the employee’s
location [32]. Governments can use location-aware
access control to deploy policies, for example, the gov-
ernment can put sanctions for a specific location and
prevent the users there from accessing some services.
The advent of ubiquitous cloud computing has raised
further concerns, those of privacy related to location
and remote access to data over insecure networks
or in insecure locations. Much has been written on
keeping stored location data secure, most of it from a
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legal perspective and concerned with citizens’ rights
as to what data is stored and their knowledge of
what is stored. However, legal positions change (e.g.,
introduction of GDPR in the UK in May 2018 [21]) and
none of this addresses how to keep these data private –
only the legality of collecting and sharing it. Therefore,
it is necessary to analyze how location-aware access
control security policies affect the user privacy.
The contribution of this paper is an innovative
prototype for location-aware access control security
policies and data privacy for CC systems. This paper
is organized as follows: We present related work in
Section 2, followed by a discussion of our threat model
in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the location-
aware access control policies for Cloud Foundry and
implement these security policies. In Section 5, case
studies will be used to evaluate the implementation of
security policies. Section 6 will examine the privacy
issues that arise from implementing location-aware
access control security policy. In Section 7, we will use
case studies to describe how privacy protections can
be integrated to protect user privacy in location-aware
access control. Section 8 will conclude the paper.
2. Related Work
In this section, we will discuss background and related
work on access control and data privacy in CC.
2.1. Access Control in Cloud Computing
According to [29], there are three main access control
policies models, namely discretionary access control
(DAC), mandatory access control (MAC) and role-based
access control (RBAC). In DAC, the resource owner is
determining the access to his/her resource. In MAC,
a central authority is responsible for setting the rules.
RBAC differs from the DAC and grant access based on
the role of the requester. In this paper, we will focus on
RBAC.
The RBAC is the common form of access control
to support the polices within classified systems,
such as financial organizations where the data of
users are classified. In such organization the security
administrator will assign the users with roles and assign
roles with access permissions [17]. The RBAC polices
consists of users (i.e., subjects), objects, operations and
roles. The user is a person in the organization. The role
is an abstraction of individual users, with the view that
a user can act in a defined role. Operations are therefore
only assigned to a role, access is then determined by
checking whether the role has the required operations
and that the user is currently acting in that role. The
objects represent the data that will be accessed [17].
The following papers extended the access control for
CC to meet the workflow security requirements of the
federated cloud computing. [39] presented a solution to
store the data of the organizations securely on public
cloud by presenting cloud storage architecture based on
RBAC roles. [37] introduced a formal model to capture
the dynamic workflow in the federated cloud where the
entities present in the cloud system can be assigned
different security levels belonging to a given security
lattice, and each cloud is assigned a security level to set
the confidentiality level of the cloud. [34] introduced
– opacity – as a security property to analyze the
workflow security after implementing security policies
in the CC systems. However, none of the above papers
considered the location of the users and data privacy
when applying access control policy in the cloud.
There are some existing work on role-based access
control and attributed-based access control. [35,
36] investigated that access control policies and
technologies would affect the productivity of the
organizations. [11] implemented location attribute into
RBAC by assigning privileges to resources based on
the attribute values of the resources, and roles to
users based on user attributes. [20] enforced and
tested location-aware attribute-based access control
for online social networks on a personal computer
as a virtual server, the geo-location was used to get
the user location. [31] proposed a new programming
paradigm called context-aware secure action system
where the functional, security and context-awareness
requirements of pervasive computing systems can be
specified and reasoned about in a uniform manner,
based on the key concepts of agent, action, context
and security policy. The security policy is specified
in the attribute-based access control model and uses
the attributes of context agents to control access
permissions dynamically as the context of the system
changes.
In addition, [4] presented a model for representing
and evaluating location-aware access control (LBAC)
conditions such as time-dependency and uncertainty of
location. Also, the proposed architecture that integrates
the represented LBAC evaluation with traditional
identity-based access control, which supports a broad
variety of location-aware policies. [12] introduced the
concept of location-aware access control and discussed
the requirements for the location-aware model. [27]
suggested using two methods to get the location
information, the first method is by using the GPS.
Although the GPS data can change within the same
build, the GPS covers a vast area with accuracy within
a few meters. The second method is by using infra-red
sensors, where the location is accurate more than the
GPS. However, this approach cannot be used within the
cloud because not all the users can have the sensors. In
our study, the Fixed IP address and the GPS data will be
used to get the user location information.
2 EAI Endorsed Transactions on 
Cloud Systems 
Online First
How Location-Aware Access Control Affects User Privacy and Security in Cloud Computing Systems
2.2. Privacy and Security in Cloud Computing
[16] assert that in the collection and correlation
of large amounts of data and with the high level
of interconnectivity, combining data from multiple
sources may improve service quality but it also
increases the risk of privacy violations. The paper
addressed location privacy and other issues associated
with ubiquitous connectivity and cloud computing, but
did not address the issue of restricting access to data
to specific locations. For example, a company may not
want staff to access sensitive documents while away
from their office, or to only be able to access client
documents while at their office and the office of the
client.
As early as 1996, [13] argued that existing user
authentication methods based on something the user
knows (e.g., username/password or PIN), something
the user has (e.g., access token or crypto-card) or
something the user is (e.g., biometrics) are not
fool proof. They assert that geodetic (geo-location)
information would add an additional layer of security
by supplementing or complementing other methods
of authentication, e.g., only allowing a user to log
in to a system from a specific location. They go
on to explore further practical uses of geo-location-
based authentication. [6] introduced this concept to the
construction industry where construction site staffmust
have on-demand access to site specific data, e.g., plans,
drawings, schedules, and budgets. More recently, [18]
examined the security aspects of geo-location-based
privacy and identity and access management. However,
there is still a long way to go to develop applications
that use geo-location based security.
Much has been written concerning security issues
with CC services. Most of these focus on traditional
security threats, e.g., network-based attacks, Virtual
Machine (VM) based attacks, storage-based attacks and
application-based attacks [23]. [28] address several
additional challenges: resource location, multi-tenancy
issues, authentication and trust of acquired informa-
tion, and cloud standards. Here, resource location is
concerned with where the information is stored and
raises the question of legislative jurisdiction. A fuller
list of what is now being called Mobile Cloud Comput-
ing (MCC), security and privacy challenges is presented
by [24]: data security, virtualization security, partition-
ing and offloading security, mobile cloud application
security, mobile device security, data privacy, location
privacy, identity privacy.
Location Privacy concerns the privacy issues sur-
rounding the location of the user. As a user moves from
one location to another, a cloud service may need to
track where that user is so that it can provide loca-
tion specific information (Google Maps is probably the
best-known example of this type of location usage) or
provide location-based security (as this project will be
examining in relation to Cloud Foundry). Should this
information become available to unauthorized actors,
it could be used to help profile the user, for example
finding places that the user frequents regularly. If data
from multiple users is exposed, this can be used to
create cross-connections between users. Are the same
two people meeting up regularly, perhaps repeatedly
using the same locations or at the same time?
Identity privacy concerns knowing who is using the
cloud service. This information is needed by the cloud
service to provide the correct and/or customized service
to the user. Should an unauthorized actor gain access
to this information, the actor could impersonate the
user or use the information to apply further refinements
to the profile of the user. [22] discussed the issues of
location and identity privacy along with proposing a
low communication cost k-anonymity algorithm which
may solve this issue.
Resource location concerns where the resources are
geographically located. Cloud services can, and do,
span the world making it difficult or impossible to
know where information is being stored. This could
present legislative issues, for example in determining
which nation’s laws covers disputes. In May 2018 the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into
effect in Europe [21]. Among other things, this law
restricts geographically where Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) is stored. The law imposes restrictions
on the transfer and storage of PII outside of the
European Union. Cloud services, being global, may
store PII anywhere without the person identified by the
information giving consent or even knowing.
3. Threat Model
We propose that location-aware access control can
mitigate some security threats in CC, in particular
threats coming from external attackers. For example,
if an attacker compromises a user’s login credentials
or externally accessible data flows (where data travels
from the user over an internet connection to the cloud
app), the attacker could pretend to be an authorized
user and identify who the user is.
The addition of location-aware access control will
mitigate this threat by restricting authorized access
to specified geographic locations, so even if the
authorized user’s login credentials are compromised,
an attacker could only log in if the attacker was at
an authorized location or able to spoof the attacker’s
location accordingly. This would require the additional
compromise of the authorized locations and the ability
to spoof those locations. However, the introduction
of location-aware access control may have privacy
implications for authorized users. By using location-
aware access control, an authorized user will have to
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provide his location and an attacker may be able to
access this location information, allowing him to build
up a profile of the authorized user’s location. Successful
attacks over a period of time may allow an attacker to
build a profile of the authorized user’s movements and
habits, for example he may visit the same location at
the same time every day. Importantly, the attacker in
this case may be internal, such as the user’s employer or
another employee.
4. Implementation of Location-aware Access Controlin Cloud Foundry
In this section, we will explain the design and
implementation of a location-aware access control in
Cloud Foundry.
4.1. Cloud Foundry
Cloud Foundry is an open source cloud application
platform governed by the Cloud Foundry Foundation
[9]. Figure 1 shows the security architecture of Cloud
Foundry.
Cloud Foundry use demilitarized zone (DMZ) and
virtual LAN (vLAN) to protect the system security [9].
The components of the Cloud Foundry run within
different vLANs on virtual machines, where the public
network only get access to the Cloud Foundry through
Load Balancers [9]. The load balancer communicates
only with the Cloud FoundryGo Routers,Outbound NAT
virtual machine (VM) and Jump Box. The load balancer
minimizes the security vulnerabilities, by limiting the
contact point of the public access to the Cloud Foundry
system. Using https BOSH Operators to deploy software
over hundreds of VMs. The BOSH consist of BOSH
Director, which controls VM creation and deployment,
as well as other software and service life cycle events.
To increase the security, the communications between
VMs only launched over the Message Bus (NATS). NATS
is an open source cloud native infrastructure messaging
system, which cannot be access from outside the Cloud
Foundry.
The public access to the Cloud Controller and
authentication UAA happens over the HTTPS protocol,
meanwhile the interaction of the Cloud Foundry
components happens over one of the three protocols
names, a publish-subscribe message bus NATS, HTTP
and SSL/TLS [9]. To identify and manage the users,
the UAA is an OAuth2 authorization server, which
issues access tokens for the applications that request
platform resource. The OAuth2 is a protocol that allows
third-party applications to grant limited access to an
HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner
or by allowing the third-party application to obtain
access on its behalf [15]. The UAA owns the user
accounts and authentication source, which support
standard protocol SAML, LDAP and OpenID [15]. To
authenticate every request with the Service Broker API,
the Cloud Controller rejects any registration without
a user name and password. The Service Broker is the
component of the service that implements the Service
Broker API, by advertising a catalog of service offerings
and service plans to the marketplace.
The public access to the Cloud Controller in the
Cloud Foundry provides REST API endpoints to access
the system and maintains a database with tables for
Orgs, spaces, services, user roles. Also, the cloud
controller manages the deployment of the application
when the user pushes the application on the Cloud
Foundry [10].
Another security component is the segments isolation
that isolates the deployment of the apps’ resources
to avoid redundant management components and
network complexity. Using isolation segments helps to
set security policies for different apps, Orgs and spaces.
The Org is a “development account that an individual
or multiple collaborators can own and use” [8], and the
spaces are the shared apps locations within the Orgs. To
view and access an Org or the spaces the user has to be
the member of the Org and spaces, the Cloud Foundry
users RBAC to grant permissions to an Org or spaces
based on the user role [9].
4.2. Location-aware Access Control in Cloud Foundry
The Cloud Foundry uses RBAC policy to control the
access to resources based on the user role [8]. The user
can have different roles within the Org in different
spaces, in other words, the user can have more than
one role. The user can have read or write scope; reading
scope is to view resources, and writing scope is to create,
update and delete resources [8]. The type of users in the
Cloud Foundry is based on the role, for example, Org
auditors, Org billing managers, Org user, developers
and space auditors [8].
The location-aware RBAC of the cloud foundry will
be based on the existing RBAC rules of the Cloud
Foundry. The existing RBAC rules of the Cloud Foundry
will be integrated based on the location of the user. The
location is divided into private and public, the private
has full access (read-write), while the public has only
read access. The integration of location-aware access
control is on two stages: first getting the user location,
then applying the existing RBAC rules for the Orgs and
spaces, based on the user location (private or public).
The user location can be used in the Cloud Foundry
to grantee the type of access the user can have within
the specific location. If the access is not authorized in
the RBAC rules then it will not be authorized in the any
location as well.
For example, the user can get full access to the Orgs
and spaces in the Cloud Foundry from the private
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Figure 1. Security architecture of Cloud Foundry
(e.g., office). However, the user can only get read-only
access from public places (e.g., train). Applying the
location-aware access control can help in achieving
accountability, separation of duties, least privilege and
usability. In our study, we will use GPS and the
static IP addressee to determine the user location, an
approximate of three-digit GPS longitude and latitude
will be used.
The role access control policy of the Cloud Foundry
code is implemented in the Cloud Foundry Controller1,
where the policies implemented using Ruby program-
ming language. The location-aware RBAC policy for
active Orgs is listed in Tables 1 and 2, where Table 1
shows the policy for private locations, while Table 2
shows the policy for public locations.
The private locations are saved on the SQL database
within the Cloud Controller, the tables are managed
by the Admin. The private locations can be IP address
or GPS coordinates, each type has a different table on
the database. After the user successfully login to the
Cloud Foundry, the Cloud Controller check the user
location and role. First, the user’s IP address is checked
if the IP address is not saved on the IP table the user’s
GPS coordinates will be collected using Geolocation
API and checked within the GPS tables. If the location
is not found on both tables the location will consider
public, to add the location to the private locations on
the database the Admin have to do it.
1https://github.com/cloudfoundry/cloud_controller_ng
5. Case Studies
To implement location-aware access control, additional
information over and above the user’s normal access
credentials are required. This information is used to
describe the location of the device that is being used to
access the sensitive data, for example an IP address or
the GPS coordinates, i.e., the location metadata.
In this section, we consider three case studies and
describe how they would use our implementation of
location-aware access control.
5.1. Confidential Documents
In a business organization, documents for a client
proposal are being stored in a CloudFoundry org. The
user has full read/write access to these documents
while in the user’s office, read-only access at the client’s
site, and is not able to access the documents from
anywhere else. To implement this policy, the user must
be the org manager or a member of the org. The office
is saved as a private location and the client’s site as
public. When the user logs in, our system detects the
user’s location and makes the access decision based on
the user’s role and location.
5.2. Health Records
In a healthcare system, health records for a patient are
being stored in a CloudFoundry org. Doctors should
have full read/write access from locations within the
hospital, the patient’s GP should have read-only access
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Table 1. Location-aware RBAC for Active Orgs when the location is private. "√" indicates that access is allowed; "?" indicates theaccess is not by default; "??" indicates Admin role does not need to be added as member of Orgs or spaces to view resources; ""indicates Org Managers can rename and edit their Orgs, but cannot delete them.




Scope of operation Org Org Org Space Space
Assign user roles
√
View users and roles
√ √ √ √ √
Create, assign Org quota plans
√
View Org quota plans







Edit, rename, delete Orgs
√ √
View spaces
√ √ √ √
Edit spaces
√ √ √
View the status, number of instances,
service bindings, and resource use of
applications
√ √ √ √
Add private domains




List application, service usage
√ √
Table 2. Location-aware RBAC for Active Orgs when the location is public. "√" indicates that access is allowed.




Scope of operation Org Org Org Space Space
Assign user roles
View users and roles
√ √ √ √ √
Create and assign Org quota plans
View Org quota plans




Edit, rename, delete Orgs
View spaces




View the status, number of instances,
service bindings, and resource use of
applications
√ √ √ √
Add private domains
Deploy, run, manage apps
Rename applications
List application, service usage
√ √
from his surgery, and the patient should have full access
to certain information that he can change (address,
phone number, etc.) from home. To implement this
policy, the doctors are org managers, the patient’s GP is
a member of the org, while the patient is space manager
within the org. For the doctors, locations within the
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hospital are saved as private and for the patient, their
home is saved as a private location.
5.3. Online Banking
A user has an online banking app, where the data
is saved in a CloudFoundry org. The user has full
access to his account while at home, with the ability
to set up standing orders, direct debits and to make
payments. The user has limited access while connected
from somewhere else, with the ability to view account
statements. To implement this policy, the user’s home is
saved as a private location, while all other locations are
public. The user will be a member of the org.
6. Privacy Analysis of Location-Aware AccessControl
This section will examine the privacy issues that
arise from implementing location-aware access control
security policy.
We will describe the additional information that will
be required over and above a user’s normal access
credentials, and then examine the threats and privacy
issues relating to this information using the LIND-
DUN (Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation,
Detectability, Disclosure of information, Unawareness,
Non-compliance) threat modeling methodology, and
then we will present generic privacy mitigation strate-
gies and tailor them to our case studies.
We use a generic app hosted on Cloud Foundry to
examine threats and privacy issues. Figure 2 shows the
data flow diagram for a user’s access to such an app.
The User (Entity E1) connects via a portal (Process P1) to
the cloud app which is running in what Cloud Foundry
calls a Diego Cell (Process P2). The app communicates
with the Cloud Foundry Cloud Controller (Process P3).
The Cloud Controller gathers the information that the
app needs to run from the CCNG Blob Store and the
CCDB (Data Stores DS1 and DS2). The Cloud Controller
also communicates via the Service Broker (Process P4)
with the Service Backend (Data Store DS3). The Service
Backend is where the sensitive data associated with
the app is stored. This is the data that, ultimately, the
user wishes to access and modify. It is also where the
data to verify the user is stored (username, password
and location metadata). The Cloud Controller CCNG,
CCNG Blob Store and CCDB are within the same trust
boundary as the CCNG Blob Store and CCDB only
contain data required by the Cloud Controller CCNG
to run the app.
6.1. Analysis of Privacy Threats
Table 3 shows the threats associated with each element
of our data flow diagram. Numbered threats are
discussed in detail in the next sub-sections. We do not
consider threats marked with X because of the following
assumptions. We assume that the two data stores DS1
and DS2 contain only data pertaining to the app that
the user is running and no sensitive or personally
identifiable information (PII). Equally, the data flows
DF4 (DS1→ P 3) and DF6 (DS2→ P 3) only carry data
pertaining to the app that the user is running and no
sensitive data or PII. The privacy threats to processes
are addressed by addressing the threats to data flows
and data stores connected to the processes. Finally, we
assume that non-repudiation is not an issue. Because
we focus on technical threats, we do not consider non-
compliance and unawareness threats.Threats to Data Stores. The data store DS3 Service
backend is susceptible to linkability, identifiability and
disclosure of information attacks.
A disclosure of information attack against a data
store requires the attacker to access the data store, for
example by hacking the server that the data store is
attached to. He can then inspect the data to locate that
which he wishes to disclose.
Linkability and identifiability attacks against a data
store require the attacker to enact a disclosure of
information attack against the data store. The attacker
can then access the user’s personally identifiable
information (login credentials, location metadata),
identify the user and/or build a profile of the user’s
access to the Cloud Foundry hosted app based on the
time and location the app was accessed, and link data
entries that are accessible by the user. This could lead
to identifying the user via the data he is able to access
and/or linking multiple users together as they are able
to access the same data.Threats to Data Flows. The data flows DF1, DF2,
DF3, DF5 and DF7 are susceptible to linkability,
identifiability and disclosure of information attacks.
A disclosure of information attack against a data flow
requires the attacker to intercept the data flow and then
examine and understand the data within the data flow.
A linkability attack against a data flow requires
the attacker to enact a disclosure of information
attack against the data flow on multiple occasions.
The attacker could then access the user’s personally
identifiable information (login credentials, location
metadata) and identify the user and/or build a profile
of the user’s access to the Cloud Foundry hosted app
based on the time and location the app was accessed.
An identifiability attack against a data flow requires
the attacker to enact a disclosure of information
attack against the data flow. Through this information
disclosure, the attacker could then access the user’s
personally identifiable information (login credentials,
location metadata) and identify the user and/or build
a profile of the user’s access to the Cloud Foundry
hosted app based on the time and location the app was
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Figure 2. Data Flow Diagram for User
Table 3. LINDDUN privacy mapping for Cloud Foundry hosted app.
L I Nr D Di U Nc
Data store DS1. CCNG Blob Store X X X X X X
DS2. CCDB X X X X X X
DS3. Service Backend 1 2 X X 3 X
Data flow DF1. 4 5 X X 6 X
DF2. 7 8 X X 9 X
DF3. 10 11 X X 12 X
DF4. X X X X X X
DF5. 13 14 X X 15 X
DF6. X X X X X X
DF7. 16 17 X X 18 X
Process P1. Portal X X X X X X
P2. Diego Cell X X X X X X
P3. Cloud Controller X X X X X X
P4. Service Broker X X X X X X
Entity E1. User 19 20 X X
accessed. Additionally, the attacker is can perform a
spoofing attack against the user.Threats to Entities. The entity E1 User is susceptible to
linkability, identifiability and unawareness attacks.
Identifiability and linkability attacks against an
entity require the attacker to enact a disclosure of
information attack against a process, data flow or
data store. The attacker could then access the user’s
personally identifiable information (login credentials,
location metadata) and identify the user and/or build
a profile of the user’s access to the Cloud Foundry
hosted app based on the time and location the app was
accessed. Additionally, the attacker is can perform a
spoofing attack against the user.
This analysis reveals multiple occasions where a
user’s personally identifiable information is at risk
of disclosure. In nearly all cases, exposure of the
user’s login credentials will mean that the associated
location metadata is also exposed. Exposure of the
location metadata can lead to additional risks to the
user, namely the user’s location can be determined,
either in real time (when data flows or processes are
compromised) or historically (when data stores are
compromised). Exposure of this information would
allow an attacker to build a more detailed profile of the
user by including the location (and time, if exposure is
in real time) that the user accesses the Cloud Foundry
hosted app.
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6.2. Privacy Protections for Location-Aware AccessControl
The previous section identified ways in which a
user’s personally identifiable information (PII) could be
compromised by using the LINDDUN privacy threat
modeling methodology. This section is concerned with
the protection of the user’s personally identifiable
information. It will propose ways in which each threat
could be mitigated by applying technological solutions
or implementing suitable policies and procedures.Mitigation Strategies for Data Stores. The assets held
by a data store that need protecting are the user’s
login credentials (user name, password, PIN), the user’s
internal identifier and the location metadata pertaining
to locations from where the user has attempted access
(IP address, GPS coordinates). These assets can be
protected from identifiability and linkability threats by
minimizing exposure of the information, for example
by removing, hiding, or generalizing, and by ensuring
confidentiality (see Table 4).
Techniques to ensure confidentiality include encrypt-
ing data at rest and secure password storage. Removing
unnecessary data, such as a long history of user loca-
tions, reduces the amount of data that can be exposed.
Stored location data can also be obfuscated, for example
by hashing IP addresses, and generalized, for example
by reducing the accuracy of GPS location data.Mitigation Strategies for Data Flows. The assets in
a data flow that need protection are the user’s
personally identifiable information (login credentials
and location metadata). These assets can be protected
against linkability, identifiability, and detectability by
removing, hiding, or generalizing transactional data
(the data being communicated) and contextual data (the
data necessary for communication) on the data flows.
Contextual data such as IP addresses can be removed
by using a Virtual Private Network or Onion Routing,
e.g. Tor [14], to hide the link between the elements
connected by the data flow.
To hide transactional data from external attackers,
data flows should use encrypted connections, such as
HTTPS (secure HTTP) and SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets
Layer/Transport Layer Security).
To hide data from internal attackers, multi-party
computation [33, 38] could be used so that user and
server jointly compare the user’s location against the
set of permitted locations, while the server does not
learn the user’s location, and the user does not learn the
set of permitted locations, but both learn the result of
the computation. Alternatively, the location metadata
could be removed from the data flow by performing
the location verification in a trusted way on the user’s
device, for example by using a zero-knowledge proof
[19, 26].
To generalize contextual data, data can be generalized
by using anonymous communications. [30] review
anonymous communication protocols in a number of
different scenarios, including anonymous web browsing
and hidden web services, both of which would be
useful in this situation. Additionally, user and server
can insert dummy traffic [25] to make it harder for
external attackers to infer that communication is really
taking place.
To generalize transactional data, i.e. to protect the
users PII against a curious server, the user could reduce
the accuracy of location data reported to the server or
inject noise into the location data [3].
Mitigation Strategies for Entities. The entity assets
that need protecting are the user’s login credentials
and location metadata, e.g., geographic location or
IP address of the user’s device. The assets can be
protected against linkability and identifiability threats
by protecting the user’s ID, e.g. through the use of
pseudonyms and technologies that preserve privacy
during the authentication process.
For example, private authentication [1, 2] can be used
to protect the authentication process against external
attackers so that the external attacker does not learn the
user’s identity. Anonymous credentials [5, 7] can protect
the user’s identity from internal attackers by allowing
anonymous but authenticated usage of the system.
7. Case Studies
In this section, we revisit the case studies from Section 5
and describe how privacy protections can be integrated
to protect user privacy in location-aware access control.
In each example the user’s location can be determined
through the user’s IP address or geo-location. Business
locations (the user’s office, client office, hospital and
surgery) would normally have a fixed IP address. The
IP address would be queried and compared against a
list of valid IP addresses. If the IP address matches any
of these, access would be granted.
A user’s home or home office is likely to have a
dynamic IP address assigned to the Internet connection.
In this situation the user’s geo-location, for example
given as GPS coordinates, would be used to determine
his location. The set of valid GPS coordinates could
be defined as either within a defined distance of a
fixed point or inside a geo-fence defined by a group of
GPS coordinates. The user’s GPS coordinates would be
queried and compared to the valid locations. Again, if it
matches any, then the requisite level of access would be
granted.
We distinguish three cases where privacy protections
are needed: the user’s location metadata during authen-
tication, the user’s identity during authentication, and
the user’s data in the service backend.
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Table 4. Mitigation strategies for linkability and identifiability of data store 3 (service backend)
Assets User login credentials (user name/password), internal user ID, location metadata
Confidentiality Secure password storage (e.g., salted hash)
Remove Limit amount of stored location data history
Hide Obfuscate location metadata (e.g., hash IP addresses)
Generalize Reduce accuracy of GPS location data
Privacy protections for the user’s location metadata
need to be designed such that the access control pol-
icy cannot be violated by an attacker. If location is
determined based on a fixed IP address, protection
options are limited because IP addresses are transmit-
ted as part of the communication protocols. Impor-
tantly, in this case, users cannot use self-defense mech-
anisms such as Tor to hide their IP address from
the server because their access level is based on their
real IP address. If location is determined based on
geo-location, obfuscation-based methods such as geo-
indistinguishability can result in random failures of
user access and should thus be avoided in our case
studies. Instead, we can use multi-party computation
or a zero-knowledge proof on the user’s device to avoid
transmitting unprotected location data and to avoid
that the server learns the user’s location. In these cases,
the user is free to use Tor, e.g. to ensure that the
adversary cannot learn which CloudFoundry service
user is accessing.
Privacy protections for the user’s identity and
login credentials need to protect the data in transit,
while still allowing successful user authentication.
Anonymous credentials are not useful in our case
because our implementation of location-based access
control needs to know the user’s identity. Instead,
private authentication mechanisms may be used. In
addition, we need to use standard mechanisms to
ensure encryption of data in transit, such as HTTPS.
Privacy protections for user data in the backend
should include secure password storage. In addition,
the server should limit size of its log files so that it stores
only a small amount of the user’s location history.
8. Conclusion
In this study, we developed an innovative prototype
for location-aware access control and data privacy for
CC systems. We applied location-aware access control
policies to role-based access control of Cloud Foundry,
and then analyzed the impact on user privacy after
implementing these security policies. Location-aware
access control can improve security in CC, but care
needs to be taken to protect the privacy of its users. This
paper established that: i. the user’s location metadata
during authentication; ii. the user’s identity during
authentication; iii. the user’s data in the service backend
are key cases where privacy protections need to be
considered when implementing location-aware access
control for an organization that uses CC. This study
can be used to address the security risks introduced by
inter-cloud use and communication. In addition, this
study can help information security providers to make
security investment decisions.Acknowledgement
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